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Abstract 
This essay argues that though the Durban Summit, unlike the Copenhagen Summit, recorded some important 
achievements, there are inherent challenges which renders the meeting less-important. The essay argues that 
though the meeting as contented by Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, South Africa’s Minister of International 
Relations, “has taken crucial steps forward for the common good and the global citizenry”, there are questions 
which continue to remain a source of challenge among states. InIn making meaning of the materials, the authors 
utilised critical analysis to explore the issues that dominate the Durban Summit. The article benefits from 
secondary materials sourced from the database of Coventry University and University of Birmingham, United 
Kingdom.  
 
Introduction 
Like the wars of the last century, environmental and climate debate across national and international level is the 
pre-occupation of state and non-state actors. More than anything else, the issue has created new tensions within 
conference halls just the same way it has appeared on the agenda of international conferences. Yet, there with 
little impacts in real sense (Bodansky, 2012: 2). The above statement aptly captures the endless negotiations on 
climate change and environmental issues in general. In contemporary times, there is hardly any issue that has 
attracted the attention of the international system such as negotiations on climate change. Even though climate 
change has been on the agenda of many international environmental meetings before the early 1990s, its basic 
principles of negotiating climate change were set out in the famous United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) which was agreed upon in the end of the Rio de Janeiro meeting in 1992 (Schipper, 
2006). 
As contended in the Rio document, parties to the Rio Convention set out to meet at least once every 
year to deliberate on actions needed to facilitate the implementation of the various agreements that may have 
been reached (Panjabi, 1997). Examples of such meetings are the conference of the parties (COP) and 
Conference and Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP). Following several other meetings, the 
Durban Conference was convened as the 17th Meeting of COP and 7th Meeting of CMP (Morel et al, 2011). 
This essay argues that though the Durban Summit, unlike the Copenhagen Summit, recorded some important 
achievements, there are inherent challenges which renders the meeting less-important. The essay argues that 
though the meeting as contented by Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, former South Africa’s Minister of International 
Relations, “has taken crucial steps forward for the common good and the global citizenry”, there are questions 
which continue to remain a source of challenge among states. To achieve the objective of the essay, it has been 
divided into four parts namely: Part I provide a background of negotiation frameworks before Durban; Part II 
discussed some of the achievements of the Summit; Part III examined some of the observable failures of the 
Summit; and Part IV assessed the Durban Summit as a whole. 
 
Part I: Other Negotiation Frameworks Before Durban Summit 
Many of the Summits that precede the Durban Summit have largely been less impressive. Some observers like 
O'Riordan and Jager (2000) argues that the absence of a definitive agreement because of the unwillingness of 
world’s greatest polluters such as the United States and China to negotiate and agreed on a legally binding 
agreement has been the major reason for the failure of many international climate conferences such as the Berlin 
Mandate (1995), Kyoto Protocol (1997), Bali (2007), Copenhagen (2009) and Cancun (2010) Conferences. 
While it would be wrong to assume that all the conferences failed because of the same purposes, many would 
agree with the fact that there has always been a division over issues of responsibilities such as the debates that 
have always enveloped developed and developing countries. While many states refused to ratify the Kyoto 
Protocol (1997) mainly because of its strict provisions and applicability (Von Stein, 2008), others contended that 
the Copenhagen Conference was a disappointment as state representatives returned home without an agreement 
(Dimitrov, 2010). The Cancun Conference (2010) which was a follow up conference to the Copenhagen (2009) 
though had its successes especially in the area of laying the foundation of the politics of eliminating the sharp 
distinction between developed and developing countries, it could not be concluded because of lack of agreement 
accentuated by the sharp distinction between developed and developing countries. In all the previous conferences 
before Durban Summit (2011), the distinction between what is popularly known as Annex I and Non-Annex I 
countries has always been clear, often without bitter disagreement and the lack of consensus (Ali, 2006). The 
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various deadlock on many instances of climate change negotiations are similar; it is either that states do not 
desire to reach a deal that would commit them to massive funding or that states are actually concerned with their 
perceived national interest, thus act only when it matters to them. This position has been aptly captured by one 
observer: The Westphalia international system encourages Nations to fight for their narrow short term perceived 
interest, making effective international cooperation on climate change extra-ordinarily difficult (Harris, P. G. 
(2013).          Again, the economic realities caused by the global economic meltdown starting from 2008 when 
Western industrialized countries slumped into serious recession and which have since spread to different parts of 
the world as a result of global capitalist network, has contributed to the unwillingness of advanced economies 
toward committing themselves to any reasonable action that may tamper with the little recoveries that have been 
witnessed so far (O'Riordan & Jager, 2012). The situation can also be offered to explain their unwillingness or 
rather inability to meet up with their $30 billion pledge to expend on emission reduction targets between 2010 
and 2012 (2012: 228). Many economies are still struggling with domestic economic pressures. This has been 
made worse with the reaction of countries like Russia, Canada and Japan who announced their unwillingness to 
take part in the second commitment regime of the Kyoto Protocol because of what they termed as lack of 
commitment from polluters, like the United States and China. Again, European Union’s conditions for the 
negotiation of a new roadmap for climate negations by 2015 have also created difficulties in the negotiations. 
No doubt, this has rendered many summits and meetings including the meetings before the Durban Summit less-
impressive. But was the Durban Summit (2011) any different? Or was it another jamboree? I have attempted to 
answer this and many other questions in the following parts of the essay. 
 
Part II: The Durban Summit and its Successes 
After intensive deliberations, the Durban Summit came up with three important decisions. These decisions 
constituted the core position of Maite NkoanaMashabane, the South African Minister of International Relations 
and Cooperation and President of the Durban United Nations Climate Change Conference, which was earlier 
quoted. For greater understanding and analysis of the perspective advance above, I will discuss the decisions on 
the basis of which, the statement accredited to South African Minister is made. 
To begin with, one of the three important results of the Durban Summit was the elimination of 
distinction between developed and developing countries or the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (Rajamani, 
2012). Lest we forget, this distinction, as stated earlier, has been one of the explanations for the failure of the 
previous summits. In other words, the clear line which often characterized previous decisions of similar summits 
since Rio Summit (1992) was completely eliminated in Durban. This decision as quoted by one observer reads: 
The delegates reached a non-binding agreement to reach an agreement by 2015 that will bring all countries under 
the same legal regime by 2020 (Rajamani, 2021, 511). 
Instead of approving and adopting the distinction between developed and developing states, the Durban 
Summit concerned with creating a scheme of reducing emissions by combine effort of all countries by 2015 to 
be followed by implementation in 2020. As a result phrases that serve as defining terms in previous conferences 
such as “historical responsibility”, “distributional equity”, “common but differentiated responsibility” (Stone, 
2012: 269) were erased. Note that these phrases were targeted at developed countries and shifting responsibilities 
to them while providing blank checks for the rest. Thus it was a historic moment when countries agreed to 
shoulder responsibilities rather than shifting and blaming others for not doing enough to save the planet. This 
dramatic change from other key international climate conferences has continued to attract comments. A 
renowned international lawyer, Bodansky (2011: 710) has tagged the conference as “a complete departure from 
the Berlin Mandate”. Similarly, (Rajamani, 2021: 506) claimed that the Durban Summit provided “new process 
and with it a clean slate on differentiation”. Still on the same line, and perhaps more clearly is the position 
advanced by Ayers (2009) who argued that the Durban is: 
deliberately poised between two eras in the Fading age of Kyoto and new phase…with 
developed and developing countries presumably on a more equal footing (2009: 227). 
However important the decision to eliminate the distinction between the developed and developing 
countries may be, the fact still remains that the developed countries are the greatest polluters and it will be 
difficult to mobilize countries who are lesser polluters to shoulder the same responsibilities with the greatest 
polluters. Again, the economic conditions of most developing countries coupled with the challenges of 
governance will impact on their commitment. This is not all; the lack of technological know-how in most 
developing economies would impede their commitment toward alternative sources of energy. This is so because, 
the developing economies rely heavily on fossil fuels to run their industries and it will be difficult to convince 
them to do otherwise. This situation is made worse by the fact that most of them see fossil fuels as strategic 
resources and therefore cannot willingly make themselves vulnerable to domestic crisis. Another important 
decision reached at the Durban Summit (2011) has to do with the enactment of new international legal regime or 
the Second Kyoto Protocol in 2015 that will come into force by 2020 (Höhne et al, 2012). No doubt this can be 
said to be a positive step in the right direction. It has helped in ensuring that the hope for an international legal 
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regime on climate change is not buried. However, this line of argument that is based on assumption that the 
mandated 2015 Conference fulfills the promises of the Durban Summit is over ambitious. That is to say, until the 
delegates to the 2015 mandated conference keeps to the dream of the Durban Summit and arrived on an 
acceptable and accommodating legal framework in 2015, such emphasis on the successes of the Durban Summit 
will be futile. Additionally, even if the 2015 new Kyoto Protocol becomes successful, states would have to deal 
with the problem of ratifying such legal framework in their individual states. This point, perhaps more than any 
other challenges, may hinder the realization of the Durban decision. One more important decision that the 
Durban Summit (2011) reached was on the need to integrate some of the Cancun Agreements through 
facilitating and mobilizing support for the Green Fund (Bird & Schalatek, 2011). This is not limited to state 
actors alone because private actors are also to be reached. More importantly, emphasis was stressed on 
developing new mechanisms that will enhance faster technological transfer and strengthen existing mechanisms 
for advancing alternative sources of energy. Other issues such as the need to discourage deforestation and 
funding new global campaign for forestation through legislation were also adopted. Certainly, all the above 
mention issues plus the need to encourage adaptation in the developing countries are serious yet important 
matters that would go down in history as some of the positive outcome of the Durban Summit and its successes. 
But the problem with the issue as will be analyzed in the foregoing section in detail is the issue of funding. 
Lessens have shown that countries are quick to pledge at conferences but when it comes to implementation, they 
provide a range of excuses that renders such promises empty. Deducing from some of the successes discussed 
above, diplomats like Maite Nkoana-Mashabane concluded that the Durban Summit recorded great milestone. 
But did the summit also have some shortcomings? This and other issues are analyzed in the following section. 
 
Part III: Shortcomings of the Durban Summit (2011)  
First, at the end of the Durban Summit, one can say that the expectation of having a new Kyoto Protocol, what 
some observers refers to as “the Second Kyoto Protocol” remains unclear. This is so because of the politics of 
deferment which fixed 2020 as the expected date for the beginning of implementation of the new international 
legal regime. Yet again, the summit excluded any binding regulation that aims at limiting emissions. This opens 
doors for unwilling states to sabotage any legal regime that may emerge, since the summit opted for voluntary 
actions and out rightly rejected binding instruments. While the Kyoto Protocol failed because of some of its strict 
applications and unwillingness by states to ratify, the Durban Summit may create greater challenge with the 
tendency for voluntary rather than binding regulations. This flexible option makes it unlikely for any reasonable 
progress even if it is ratified by all states. This is so because setting emission targets with binding regulations 
makes it possible to weight progress that will be made and provide scale for measuring successes and challenges 
for improvement. 
Second, concerning the pledges by developed countries to mobilize $30 billion between 2010 and 2010 
and $100 billion yearly from 2020 toward the sustenance of the Green Fund, it will not be out of place to argue 
that the amount is largely inadequate taking into cognizance the challenge posed by climate change with 
damaging effect (Adger et al, 2003) . More so, none of the developed countries identified the sources in which 
the fund will be raise. As observed by one commentator, it aims at opening doors for private investment directly 
and administered by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). If this is true, it will 
convert the Green Fund into some sort of “exploitative employer’s fund” (Capoor & Ambrosi, 2012). This 
implies that the desire to make profits out of a globally recognized environmental and climate problems is no 
longer hidden. It raises doubt on the genuineness and commitment of states that make such pledges. But this is 
not surprising, as state’s actions and inactions are hardly dictated by moral compass. State’s actions and 
inactions as has been studied over time, are on protecting their national interest. The outcome of the Durban 
Conference created more opportunities for what has become known as “Green capitalism” (Friedmann, 2012: 
227). He further argued: 
The trend towards commoditization of nature has become the dominant philosophical point of 
view in environmental governance (2012: 228).  
Taking into the cognizance the outcome of the repetitions in some of the terms of Cancun Conference (2010) and 
Copenhagen Conference (2009), one can argue that rather than ensuring the security of the climate through 
proactive measures toward curbing emissions, the interest of multinational corporations and their managers 
(from both North and South divide) has instead been the primary consideration. The elimination of distinction 
between industrialized countries and developing countries has raised fears of many developing economies that 
they may come under severe pressure to take equal steps in limiting greenhouse gas. To some, the idea that the 
summit helped in taking “crucial steps forward for the common good and global citizenry” is not only factually 
misleading but erroneously contrived (Bond, 2012: 50). This is so because of what he termed as one sided result 
in favour of major polluters. To him, the mainstreaming of responsibilities and equal sharing of the burden of 
commitment to climate change will place less developed countries and developing countries under severe stress. 
Though the above position can be seen as familiar defenses offered by developing countries who often cite the 
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lack of funding and some deep historical explanations for their contemporary situations, yet a closer look at these 
countries’ economic indicators shows that they may not likely ratify or comply with any legal framework or 
decision that may be reached in 2015, thus there will be no prospects of implementation by 2020. This implies 
that the hope and expectations of rural communities who are faced with real pressure from the effect of climate 
change 
(some of who registered their presence outside of Durban Conference Hall) is dashed as there was no single 
immediate results that will reduce the effect of climate problems on their lives and environment.  
 
Part IV: Assessment of the Durban Conferences  
My analyses of the successes and shortcomings of the Durban summit when properly aligned will provide us 
with a clear assessment of the understanding of Durban Summit. If we measure successes strictly by result of the 
summit to resolve the climate change problem, then the Durban Summit was not any close to been successful. 
Our definition of successes must not be as ambitious as we apply to other minor and individual issues of life. 
This is because in examining complex international issues such as international climate negotiations, having a 
roadmap toward progress could still be regarded as success or to those conferences as been successful. The most 
crucial matter in particular case of the Durban summit is whether it resulted to possible future outcomes and does 
not hinder the continuation of dialogue among states. Comparing the outcomes of Durban summit and other 
summit would help us in appreciating some of the positive outcomes as well as challenges that characterized the 
Durban Summit. Our assessment would therefore be limited to the outcomes of the Durban summit namely: 
Laying the roadmap for a new international legal framework that will come into force by 2020; eliminating the 
distinction between developed and developing countries; and integration of some of the key elements of the 
Cancun Agreement. One can say that the summit laid the foundation, though based on hope and expectations and 
dependent upon what comes up in 2015, for meaningful action in the long run. However, there are crucial grey 
areas that need critical attention. The Durban Summit has put on hold what need immediate, if you like, urgent 
responses. This is because the negative effect of climate change is multiplying such that any delay in taking 
actions necessary to curb the effects can only amount to deeper negative consequences. Recent scientific 
researchers have proven that methane which is released in millions of tons everyday has far more devastating 
consequences than greenhouse gases. And the rampant use of methane in contemporary times has multiplied thus 
exposing humankind to greater risk just like the environment to more damaging effects. Thus continuous 
politicization of climate negotiations through postponement of actions as witnessed in Durban exposed us to 
greater danger and deeper insecurity. Again, collapsing the clear line distinguishing Annex I countries and Non-
Annex I countries or the developed and developing countries under the so called Durban Platform for Enhanced 
Action is one of the key decisions of the Durban Summit. This way, it has awakened the developing countries 
who over the years have continued to hide under the pretext of their categorization as developing countries while 
polluting the atmosphere and shifting the responsibility on developed countries. Worthy of note is the fact that 
this distinction was one of the critical issues that saw the failure of Copenhagen in 2009. While eliminating the 
distinction has helped to open up new way forward, it has perhaps created more doubt in the minds of observers 
on the commitment of developing countries who may have reluctantly agreed to the elimination of distinction. 
Listen to one environmentalist: 
We are not sure that the developing countries would agree to enforce any legal framework that seeks to 
place them at par with the developed countries who are in fact the greatest polluters of the environment 
(Mumma, 2000: 10). 
The doubt expressed above calls for a reconsideration of the over-rated successes of the Durban Summit 
of 2011. Considering the high level politics involved in this debate and in previous conferences such as the Bali 
Conference and the Copenhagen Conference, it will be highly unlikely for any meaningful outcome in 2015. 
After all, most nations in the global south do not have the scientific knowhow to develop and use at large, 
alternative sources of energy and there is no tangible indication of reducing emissions by 2020, the year set out 
for the beginning of the implementation of the Second Kyoto Protocol. 
Another critical issue worthy of note is the prospect or otherwise of ratification of the new international 
legal regime that is meant to be in place by 2015. Many nations including the United States have complex 
domestic procedures in ratifying international legal regimes. There are deep seated domestic contradictions such 
as congresses and party influence which in the past has voided international legal regimes. The problem is 
further compounded by the doubtfulness in the minds of many analyst who are not convince that an international 
legal regime such as the one proposed by the Durban Summit can actually resolve complex situations like the 
case of climate change. 
In conclusion, while there are observable challenges that emanate from some of the key decisions 
reached at Durban, the Summit had indeed taken rear steps toward the emergence of a new international legal 
regime that will serve to continue the dialogue toward resolving the complex problems of climate change. As 
analyzed above, the Durban Summit may be a success but its decisions rely solely on hope and expectation of a 
International Affairs and Global Strategy                                                                                                                                          www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-574X (Paper)  ISSN 2224-8951 (Online) 
Vol.44, 2016 
 
52 
successful 2015 Conference. But once the 2015 conference is able to enact the Second Kyoto Protocol, there is 
the likelihood that the mistakes of the First Kyoto Protocol will be overcome. No doubt, this will vindicate the 
ambitious conclusion by Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, South African Minister of International Relations and 
Cooperation and President of the Durban UN Climate Change Conference who claimed that ‘We have taken 
crucial steps forward for the common good and the global citizenry today’ 
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